WWII aircraft armament machine guns and cannon

[Pumpkin]

Totally agree!
When I read this I wondered how I never dug up some of those as a boy.

One other thought, the Hurricanes 8 guns were concentrated in 2 tight groups of 4. The Spitfire had its 8 spread across the wings, could this have been a less effective setup?

[44 AMP]

One other thought, the Hurricanes 8 guns were concentrated in 2 tight groups of 4. The Spitfire had its 8 spread across the wings, could this have been a less effective setup?

No. Neither arraignment is more effective than the other. The guns are adjusted so the fire converges at a set distance, the position in the wing is irrelevant, for that.

The Hurricane has thick wings, which allowed the guns to be grouped together. The Spitfire has thinner wings and they flex more, so the guns were spaced differently to fit in the wing and keep the aircraft in balance better.

One of the reasons accuracy seemed so poor in the Battle of Britain period was (I believe pre-war) RAF doctrine for the fighter's guns to be set to converge in an 8-10 FOOT circle at 300 yards. Dowding is said to have approved this, believing it would make hits if the pilot wasn't a particularly good shot. This became known as "the Dowding spread". Combat experience, and some senior pilots and aces commanding squadrons led them to order the guns aligned to hit in a small area, making them much more effective on the target. The spread doctrine was ignored, and because of the obvious improvement in combat results, faded away.

Combat is the steepest learning curve, WWII is full of examples of what seemed like good ideas in peacetime turning out to be of limited use, or ineffective or even detrimental in actual combat. I think all wars are, but WWII has so many technical or tactical ideas that didn't work out the way the brass thought they would, its a rich area for study.

Its a bit cliche but one can find many examples of where one man's ideas literally altered the course of the war, for better or worse.

Its not all just the commanders and govt leaders, sometimes, it some staff guy or design engineer.

[bamaranger]

I read this story a few years back and will give the condensed version, it ties in with the "clearing and charging" discussions on this thread.

Briefly, when peace had been declared v. Japan, there were still CAP being flown, with strict regs as to what the patrolling aircraft could shoot at. If I recall correctly, these flights could only engage what was deemed to be Kamikaze aircraft. Now that is a vague recollection, but the upshot of it all was that these flights could not engage vessels/surface craft.

The narrator claimed that when his flight would pass over a specific bay with small sampans in it, they would take sporadic small arms fire, rifle fire from assorted boats. That was not well regarded by the pilots, but supposedly they could not shoot back. However, a couple of the aircraft involved in this charade would always return down a few cartridges in their ammo belts, but the guns would be unfired? Allegedly the pilots in question were cycling some type of mechanism on the aircraft, which cycled the guns and ejected live cartridges and links, in an attempt bop the offending sampans.

I know I read this, and I wanna say it was P-51's in Tokyo Bay, but I could be wrong.

[Pumpkin]

Pesky Arisakas!
I never heard of this but if possible, I sure could understand!
Rules of engagement…
Could this have been a function available for clearing a jam?
I would imagine a 50BMG round dropped from any distance would have done some real damage to the old melon.
Very interesting.

[44 AMP]

The charging mechanism pulls the bolt back and then lets it go. It is separate from the firing system. I believe US fighter gun chargers were electric, and so could be operated multiple times. So, yes, it is entirely possible to eject unfired rounds (and links) from the aircraft.

We dropped THE BOMB on Nagasaki on Aug 9th. There was coup and counter coup fighting in the Japanese high command over the next few days, some factions for continuing to fight and others for ending the war. The end the war faction eventually prevailed, and the matter was settled when the Emperor announced acceptance of the surrender and the end of hostilities on Aug 15th.

The actual surrender document was signed on Sept 2nd.

It was expected (and some did happen) that individuals would, on their own, continue to attack US forces, if they could. The primary concern was kamikazies. Orders were issued, offensive operations were suspended with the announcement of Japan's surrender.

However, fleet CAP was maintained, and the fleet commander ordered that any attacking Japanese aircraft were to be shot down, "in a friendly manner".

[RC20]

Remember that the Battle of Britian was the first truly large scale, and long range (for the time) aerial combat of the war. Both sides found out where pre-war doctrine, tactics and equipment was found to be flawed and lacking.

Arguably the distances in WWI were not that different. Some long range stuff including bombers and the Zeppelins. The Germans were just across the channel. Spain was similar. The main issue for the Germans (good news) was their air force was oriented to Army support.

You also get into the Weeds of locating airfields close to the channel where they could not take off and reach altitude as well as subjected to bombings.

Better would have been to move back to mid fields further back and use the fighters to the North and those fields as activate and assign as raids were developed and fighter command had determined where they would go.

Even taking off from Fields in France on the coast (or close aka Abbeville) the German fighters did not have much range let alone staying time once over England.

Why did not regular night bombings occur to those fields?

And there was the undermining of Fighter Command by Leigh-Mallory’s - its clear he in conjunction with Douglas brought down Dowding.

Park had to be cognizant of it and pulling his fighters back would have put them in Leigh-Mallory’s area.

Post Battle harassment of Leigh-Mallory were negative and the staffs worked around him for the Normandy invasion.

You can bring in pilots wasted in staff positions and lack of cooperation in the Midlands from Leigh-Mallory’s command.

There is also a lot of variance in reporting on management on the UK side. They did not allow fighter squadrons they did not rotate allowing some down time.

The Vic formation was a serious issue and only time and fighting were going to get things changed.

I don't think the battle was as close a thing as many historians say it was, not that it was not fraught, but they still had reserves and if it had been closer, they would have used them.

As for gas octane, UK got its fuel from the US. That is where the high octane fuels were developed allowing higher hp out of engines.

[Pumpkin]

A question:
What if the Luftwaffe air campaign had been successful enough for Operation Sea Loin to take place?
I believe there would have been a bunch on dead Germans in the channel.
Did they have any landing craft capable of ferrying the troops across the channel, I haven’t ever seen anything they had that impressed me.
Besides, I maybe biased, I feel the Royal Navy might have had something to say about allowing Britain to be invaded.

[44 AMP]

Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of England was not something considered practical, or even possible, and wasn't considered at all in German pre war planning.

The success of the Blitzkrieg astonished the German High Command nearly as much as it did the Allies. The German High Command expected it to work, but were stunned by how well and how fast it worked.

Poland lasted a bare 26 days. Norway was invaded Apr 9th, and didn't officially surrender until June 10th, but was essentially beaten in a month.

The German attack on France and the low countries began on May 10th, the British were driven to the sea and evacuated the last week of May and into the first week of June, recovering some 330,000 men at through "miracle of Dunkirk", but leaving all of their heavy equipment, and a significant percentage of their lighter arms as well.

France surrendered on June 25th.

Essentially leaving the Wehrmacht in a "now what do we do?" situation, one they never counted on having, and particularly, so soon.
When Britain made it clear that an armistice wasn't going to happen, Hitler ordered plans to be made and resources gathered.

One point all the planners agreed on was that the invasion could not succeed without control of the air. IF the Luftwaffe could knock out the RAF, then German air and seapower stood a shot at neutralizing the Royal Nave enough to get the invasion across. But, without taking out the RAF there was no chance, so that was the intention of the Battle of Britain, to knock out the RAF, so the invasion could stand a chance of success.

They tried, and might have managed it, if Hitler hadn't changed his priorities from military ops to political terror bombings.

Although the British held the field (the common definition of winning a battle) it wasn't a win as much as it was a "not losing" and when things were clear there wasn't going to be a quick or easy victory, Hitler turned his attention, and the bulk of his forces toward the "real" enemy, the Soviet Union.

And got distracted on the way there, so things didn't go as forseen in Russia, either.

He probably expected England to "wither on the vine" and no longer be a threat, but things didn't work out that way, either.

Despite how much armchair experts make of the ineffectiveness of the 8 gun .303 British fighters, they scored heavily against the Luftwaffe, so, one cannot, in fairness say they didn't work.

[Pumpkin]

Yes, the outcome solidifies that fact.
.303’s and a cup of tea.
A lot of both!

[44 AMP]

As for gas octane, UK got its fuel from the US. That is where the high octane fuels were developed allowing higher hp out of engines.

While the British did import gas from the US, it wasn't always what the US used. For many things, including some aircraft use it didn't make much difference. However certain high performance aircraft (such as the P-38) didn't get top performance from British gas which eventually resulted in supplies of US grade fuel being sent to England.

[davidsog]

I'd love to see a link to the full paper so we could tell exactly what the British were testing.

I have the whole copy in my filing cabinet somewhere. It came from the USAF Museum Archives. It's a Royal Aircraft Establishment (like our NACA and later NASA) vulnerability test of the FW-190A series.

IIRC, The RAE ended up with at least 4 FW-190's after Faber's WNr 212. Most of them were FW-190G series from 10/JG2, 10/JG26, and later SchlachtGeschwader 10. One of them they tested to destruction. The conditions are actually listed on that first page I posted.

They were testing how effective their Aircraft Armament was in bringing down a Focke Wulf FW190.

It's a good bit of history that does not get a lot of mainstream attention outside of professional military air power planners. The basic strategy of the Tip and Run Raiders and study of the that campaign forms the foundation for Modern NATO Air Forces Tactical Doctrine.

Good example of the evolution of that is The Invasion of Iraq. There was very little strategic style level bombing conducted. The "1000 points of Light" was all Tactical Fighter Bomber aircraft dropping precision munitions.

It's just one more thing The Luftwaffe really screwed up because they had no real BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment) as part of their planning.

England was very lucky in that regard. The two instances that lack of BDA caused strategic mistakes can be seen in the initial raids on the Radar Stations. The Luftwaffe quickly abandoned attacking them despite the raids being quite effective and had they continued would have denied The RAF the Command and Control advantage that was a key component to The Luftwaffe's defeat.

The "Tip and Run" Raiders was viewed by the Luftwaffe planners as a mere nuisance with little to no effect on the air war. As it turned out, a tiny handful of German Aircraft created two whole Allied Air Army's and tied down thousands of airplanes, tens of thousands of men, materials, and equipment in "The Air Defense of Great Britain" not to mention the Psychological impact on the British populace all out of proportion to the pittance of planes, pilots, and material The Luftwaffe dedicated to it.

Chris Goss's book:

Luftwaffe Fighter-bombers Over Britain: The Tip and Run Campaign, 1942-1943

https://www.abebooks.com/first-editi...31950652949/bd

[44 AMP]

There are numerous examples during the war of a small group requiring the expenditure of a large amount of men and resources to keep them contained (or attempt to do so)

Most of the ones commonly known are naval or ground examples, but the air war has its share as well.

[davidsog]

There are numerous examples during the war of a small group requiring the expenditure of a large amount of men and resources to keep them contained (or attempt to do so)

Most of the ones commonly known are naval or ground examples, but the air war has its share as well.

Yes but factually, Our Doctrine of today is based upon the Campaign of 10/JG2, 10/JG26, and SG 10. The Allies had 43 squadrons dedicated to nothing but trying to defend against these three units.

Take a look at one unit in the thick of it, I/SG10.

From inception in Nov 1943 to Normandy....
They lost 22 Aircraft to enemy action.

Abgang is losses.

"durch Feindeinw" column is losses to enemy action. That is 2.75 planes a month. Extremely light casualties to tie up 43 squadrons not to mention all the searchlight Crews, Flak Crews, and Observers.

https://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/schlacht/bisg10.html

[44 AMP]

Today's SAM batteries and radar controlled guns are quite good, and the main impetus behind the development of stealth capability.

Quite a bit different from the 1940s trying to stop single or pairs of "wave skimmers" who pop up, drop their ordnance and dive away at high speed.

For every thing, there is a counter. It many not be easily found, or simple, won't be cheap or easy, very often, but it is out there, somewhere.

[davidsog]

Quite a bit different from the 1940s trying to stop single or pairs of "wave skimmers" who pop up, drop their ordnance and dive away at high speed.

It's no different at all. It's evolved but remains the same in principle. Modern Doctrine uses tactical attack aircraft to deliver precision attacks against strategic targets in systemic bombing campaigns.

However, prior to the southern France detachment and the inactivity of the last two months of the year, it should be stressed that the new British aircraft and tactics were unable to prevent what was the Luftwaffe’s largest daylight attack on Britain since 1940. Hitler, increasingly annoyed by Bomber Command’s offensive, ordered a full strength vengeance attack against Canterbury on the evening on the 31st of October 1942. The attack was carried out purely by fighter-bombers, coming from the two recognised fighter-bomber squadrons and which were reinforced by an unknown number of temporary fighter-bombers drawn from fighter units and the unit which had been temporarily withdrawn from North Africa. The total force, including escorts, numbered 62 Focke Wulf 190s.
The attack was an embarrassment to the British defences. The German formation approached the Kent coast at wave-top height in three waves, hedgehopped approaching the outskirts of Canterbury, then climbed, dropped 31 bombs which killed 32 people and damaged countless buildings, and streaked back for France. British defences claimed to have shot down 10 fighter-bombers and suspected a further aircraft had been destroyed hitting a balloon cable. The true cost was one fighter bomber lost to anti-aircraft fire after it had dropped its bomb, one fighter- bomber lost part of its wing to a balloon cable but returned safely and one of the escorts was shot down by an RAF fighter. To add further embarrassment, German fighters shot down two RAF fighters.
As a vengeance attack, the attack on Canterbury was an unmitigated success with the British acknowledging that 70% of the total weight of bombs fell in the target area but failing to acknowledge their failure to intercept the raid.

[44 AMP]

It's no different at all. It's evolved but remains the same in principle.

Evolved to the point where it only the same in macro. Modern radars, airborne radars, individual aircraft and individual missle's radars, computer control, guided munitions, etc., quite a bit different in detail from the 1940s when every aimed shot was by eye through a gunsight.

yes, the general principle is constant, shoot/bomb the bad guys, but the methods and equipment employed to do it have changed tremendously.

[davidsog]

methods and equipment employed to do it have changed tremendously.

Yes, they have changed because we adopted lessons learned from The Luftwaffe's experience in the Tip and Run Campaign.

You seem to missing the point of using Tactical Attack Aircraft in the same Strategic role as what used to be by doctrine a heavy strategic bomber.

Modern Doctrine uses tactical attack aircraft to deliver precision attacks against strategic targets in systemic bombing campaigns.

[44 AMP]

Yes, they have changed because we adopted lessons learned from The Luftwaffe's experience in the Tip and Run Campaign.

And adjusted and added to that with lessons learned in the years since then. Don't forget the lessons learned in Vietnam where strategic heavy bombers were used for tactical support and tactical strike aircraft (fighterbombers) were sent into North Vietnam to perform strategic strikes.

Tools change and tactics evolve to get the best use from them. Mistakes do get made, recognized, corrected and lessons learned added to the planning and training.

I think it highly unlikely we will repeat the disaster of "Desert One" where what seemed like small things caused the failure of the mission to rescue the Iranian held hostages during the Carter years, but I am sure we will make other mistakes from time to time. Seems like the worst "tactical" mistakes are often created and forced on the troops by the flawed decisions of high ranking brass and political leaders.

Our entire combined arms concept, indispensable in modern warfare, was developed from the lessons taught by the success of the Blitzkrieg, and what we learned afterwards.

[2damnold4this]

I have the whole copy in my filing cabinet somewhere. It came from the USAF Museum Archives. It's a Royal Aircraft Establishment (like our NACA and later NASA) vulnerability test of the FW-190A series.

IIRC, The RAE ended up with at least 4 FW-190's after Faber's WNr 212. Most of them were FW-190G series from 10/JG2, 10/JG26, and later SchlachtGeschwader 10. One of them they tested to destruction. The conditions are actually listed on that first page I posted.

They were testing how effective their Aircraft Armament was in bringing down a Focke Wulf FW190.

I'd love to be able to read the entire paper. I'd like to know if the Brits were evaluating their Vickers .50 and not the BMG.

[RC20]

While the British did import gas from the US, it wasn't always what the US used. For many things, including some aircraft use it didn't make much difference. However certain high performance aircraft (such as the P-38) didn't get top performance from British gas which eventually resulted in supplies of US grade fuel being sent to England.

The US delivered fuel that we were capable or producing. I believe that was up to 130 Octane which was what the Brits wanted as the detonation issues in too much boost and them willing to use it made it the fuel of choice.

As far as I know the Brits had no refineries. All their oil and fuel came from overseas (not necessarily the US but most of it when the Med was cut off).

The US needed that high octane fuel for the P-51B and on (with its Merlin engine).

[RC20]

Keep in mind that the Germans fought at a severe disadvantage (happily so).

They had a longer flight and over water and if a Brit pilot bailed out, if he was alive he was recovered. The Germans lost all pilots who bailed out and probably within 10 miles of the UK coast (their rescue service operated somewhere in those margins).

But they also had a flight back over the channel, so anything that went down as crews and aircraft very possibly gone.

A perforated aircraft on a field in France was almost as good as shot down (the Germans still had the pilot though he could well have been shot up as well).

The 8 gun ships worked, just not as effective as 20 mm cannon or even a US 50 Cal. You just had to stuff it in close.

[Pumpkin]

The 27L Merlin was at a size disadvantage especially to the 33.9L DB601A in the 109’s.
To make up the power difference it was run at higher boost levels which required the highest octane available. US fuels were probably some of the best at the time.

[44 AMP]

It has been often reported that the P-38s, in England, in particular, had performance issues attributed to "British gas".

Also note that P-38s operating in other theaters do not have corresponding reports of issues due to the fuel, which was supplied from the US by the Army.

This leads to the conclusion that there had to be something different about the fuel used. Isn't it possible that the fuel sold to Britain was different in some way from what was used in the US? Octane rating isn't the only thing that can be different in different grades of gasoline.

[Pumpkin]

I believe it came down to pressure on either sides fuel production infrastructures.
The US was relatively un-harassed with access to more refined chemicals including TEL which enabled them to more easily produce higher octane fuel.
The Germans had to constantly work under much more pressure due to Allied bombing and used inferior base chemicals like coal, I think

[davidsog]

I'd like to know if the Brits were evaluating their Vickers .50 and not the BMG.

I would assume it is a Browning .50 caliber as in 1939, the RAF officially retired the Vickers .50 cal due to its unreliability.

The Browning .50 cal was adopted instead also in 1939. The report is almost 4 years after that decision so it would make little sense to test an obsolete and retired weapon system.

It would be like concluding Muskets don't work well either.