Don Kilmer (CalGuns Foundation) has filed a request for rehearing and/or
en banc for Nordyke. The filing can be read
here.
The request asks 3 important questions about the decision rendered by the panel, with the first question being a real zinger:
Quote:
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(1) To consider the exceptionally important question of why – with respect to the Second Amendment, an enumerated fundamental right – the verb clause “undue burden” is an appropriate substitute for the verb “infringed.” (2) In order to insure uniformity of Ninth Circuit decisions, whether the test in U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) used by the Nordyke panel is congruent with this Court’s en banc application of that test as set forth in Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2009). And (3), to determine why the original panel treated Nordykes’ equal protection claim like a substantive due process claim.
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Chuck Michel (C.D. Michel & Associates) is the lead attorney for the California Rifle and Pistol Association (CRPA). With help from the NRA, the CRPA has filed its appeal in the
Peruta (San Diego) case.
Krucam, over at MDShooters has uploaded the Complaint:
http://mdshooters.com/attachment.php...0&d=1306240964
This is a huge 143 page PDF, which I haven't had time to fully read. Here are the questions as presented in the appeal:
Quote:
1. Does the Second Amendment right to “bear arms” protect the right to carry a loaded handgun in public in some manner, either openly or concealed?
2. Does allowing restricted open carry of unloaded handguns that may be loaded only after one is faced with “immediate, grave danger” provide a reasonable alternative means to bear arms, one that satisfies the Second Amendment right to be “armed and ready” for action in case of confrontation?
3. Was there undisputed, or any, evidence that openly carrying an unloaded handgun allows one to be “armed and ready” for immediate self-defense, or that reducing the number of law-abiding citizens permitted to carry loaded handguns (by denying them concealed carry permits) reduces crime or otherwise serves an important public purpose?
4. Do the classifications created by County’s concealed weapon permit issuance policies and practices violate the equal protection clause in light of recent Supreme Court authority that confirms the right to bear arms is fundamental?
5. Did the district court err in relying on cases distinguishing between residents and non-residents in granting County’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Peruta’s right to travel, equal protection, and Privileges & Immunities claims, when no determination concerning his residency was ever made?
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