[zukiphile]

You have difficulty seeing how the rationale of Wickard could be applied to an intrastate act where the act does not involve production, and you assert that production is integral to that rationale. Up thread I have noted that this exhibits a confusion between the rationale of Wickard and its fact pattern.

Having misunderstood the prior explanation, you misread the next one, miss the problems with your question, and repeat it.

Originally Posted by JohnKsa

The argument in Wickard explains how intrastate production falls under the commerce clause. It doesn't "extend it".

If that were not true, the Supreme Court would have, instead of agreeing unanimously that the prosecution was Constitutional, disagreed and explained why Wickard was an overstep and not within the jurisdiction of the federal government.

I mean, you can certainly hold the personal opinion that they got it wrong, but that's all it is--personal opinion. By definition, their unanimous agreement that Wickard was a constitutional prosecution, demonstrates that it does not extend the powers of Congress beyond the power of the commerce clause which allows them to regulate interstate commerce.

Emphasis added. Note that the assertion to which you respond is about the authority of Congress extending beyond commerce. Your response is about extending the commerce clause, a different thing, and is merely tautological.

Originally Posted by JohnKsa

The quote from Jackson goes on to state that to be under the power of Congress, an activity must "exert a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce".

To claim that production is not a necessary condition, you must come up with some way to explain how an exclusively intrastate activity could "exert a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce" without changing national supply.

No, I just have to be able to read and understand Wickard. Where you have just read the text of that case that tells you explicitly that “the subject of… “production,”… is, therefore, not material for purposes of deciding the question”, your assertion that production is integral to the rationale is plainly incorrect unless you believe that justice Jackson does not understand the rationale of his decision.

Originally Posted by JohnKsa

However you want to word it.

Good. The way I word it is that you have purported to find an “obvious” flaw in my explanation of the case to you, and read Wickard in support of the proposition that intrastate production is interstate commerce. Yet, Wickard says this nowhere. Like the once popular assertion that Heller upheld “reasonable restrictions” on firearms, the notion arises from a misreading of the case.

Originally Posted by JohnKsa

Ok, let's try it again, with a wording alteration that eliminates your objection but changes nothing material to the construct.

That is incorrect. Whether the activity involved is commerce is a central element in a commerce clause analysis, so that observation is material to the rationale.

Originally Posted by JohnKsa

Let's say that I am engaged in the production items/material for my own personal use. The items/material are legal to produce, own, possess and use/consume under all state and federal law. The items/material never cross state lines, they are never bought or sold, in fact they never leave my possession. The federal government claims that they can regulate my activities (including criminally prosecuting me) under the power of the interstate commerce clause.

You might like to give that challenge more thought. If the item is legal to produce, own, possess, use and consume under federal law, for what are you being criminally prosecuted?

A case does not arise unless the government is attempting to enforce an authority given to it under the commerce clause. An enforcement action where the item is federally legal to produce, own, possess, use and consume under all federal laws is not an example of an exercise of commerce clause power. To ask for an example of a valid exercise of this federal power and the underlying rationale for it requires some kind of restriction that your question forecloses.

Originally Posted by JohnKsa

Since you believe that a change in national supply is not integral/necessary to the argument, you may not use that argument in your explanation.

If you meant to ask for an example of an exercise of federal power under the commerce clause where a change in national supply is not integral to the exercise of that commerce clause power, we already have it.

In Gonzalez v. Raich, the cultivation was not an issue because one of the respondents engaged in no cultivation whatsoever. Nevertheless, her possession fell within federal authority under the Controlled Substances Act.

While the federal government presented arguments about the difficulties in distinguishing putatively local trade in the substance from the illicit market, the court was explicit about what it was doing.

In assessing the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause, we stress that the task before us is a modest one. We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a “rational basis” exists for so concluding. Lopez, 514 U. S., at 557; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276–280 (1981); Perez, 402 U. S., at 155–156; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 299–301 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 252–253 (1964). Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, 21 U. S. C. §801(5), and concerns about diversion into illicit channels,[Footnote 33] we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA. Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce … among the several States.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8. That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/1/

Kindly note the last sentence.

Your intrastate sale of a used firearm would not exist within a safe haven from the exercise of federal power merely because you may assert that the sale would not alter production or supply. It would fall within the rationales of Wickard and Raich as a category of action, though entirely intrastate, that could “undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity”.

Originally Posted by JohnKsa

I wondered how you would avoid answering the question.

You really didn’t. I had noted the Amended Gun free Zones Act which applies to used arms as well if they have some nexus with interstate commerce. If you review US. V. Lopez, you see an analysis of a restriction on intrastate possession and whether there is a connection to interstate commerce. Supply and production aren’t elements of that rationale.