FBI Miami shootout: Better Handgun Caliber or better Tactics

[pt100]

Heres a thought, maybe the agents were dedicated enough to put their assses on the line so these two vermin would not kill any civillians

[Starsky]

I am not being a smartbutt here in any way. Could the FBI guys have been better prepared weapon wise? YES. Should they have been? YES, but they for whatever reason weren't so they had to work with what they had. But as a retired LEO and as I have stated many times esp in police training. A paper target that is not shooting back is damn easy to shoot at and hit with precision. In real life shootouts are NOTHING like they are in the movies, TV, books and yes even in police training. I venture to say that VERY FEW on this or any other forum have ever been involved in a actual life or death police shootout or in many cases have never even pointed a gun at anything more alive than a B27 target. Coming from one that has I say all of these FBI guys were heros and the caliber of ammo had little to do with anything that day.

[JohnKSa]

I know this wont sit well...

It would sit a lot better if it were supported by facts instead of just stated as fact repeatedly without supporting evidence.

[Shawn Dodson]

Capt Charlie writes:

If I recall, the original 10mm round as adopted by the FBI was a pretty hot load. Too hot, according to the FBI. They thought female agents had trouble handling it, so they reduced the load to the point that it didn't match the .45 ACP. Somebody finally figured that out and they went to the .40.

The FBI load, as adopted by the FBI, was originally developed (handloaded) by John Hall, then Chief of FBI-FTU.

The claim that it was *reduced* because it was too hot and some agents couldn't handle it is untrue.

A 180gr 10mm bullet has the same sectional density as a 230gr .45 ACP bullet. When both bullets are propelled at similar velocity and percentage of expanded diameter is similar, then penetration is similar. Hence the FBI 180gr 10mm subsonic load exactly duplicated the .45 ACP 230gr load.

More info about FBI selection of the 10mm can be found in notes provided by then Assistant Chief of FBI-FTU Urey Patrick: http://www.firearmstactical.com/pdf/fbi_10mm_notes.pdf

Cheers!

[Capt. Charlie]

Thanks for the correction, Shawn. I'd heard what I posted several times, but never was able to confirm it through a reliable source.

I guess that's another candidate for Snopes .

[Jager1]

I apologize for the rescuscitation, but I just spotted this thread and wished to address where one forum member opted to address my comments.

Nonsense. The Feds have always had lots of neat toys to play with, but usually they are left in the safe. The FBI agents, as stated, were armed as was typical for officers on surveillance or usual street duty--handguns and shotguns. Some agents did apparently have subguns, but were doing surveillance in another part of town.

“Nonsense” would be the DECISION, active or passive, that led to FBI agents carrying inadequate firepower resulting in their getting themselves shot to pieces. The FACT is that these agents were attempting to LOCATE and perform surveillance on two known heavily armed and dangerous suspects. They had to recognize that their cover might be blown and if so, that they might not be up to the task of engaging the suspects head-on on an immediate basis. What OTHER agents had in other parts of town has nothing to do with the agents on the actual battlefield that day. History regarding strategy and tactics is written primarily from the presence, actions and experience of the units in the engagement. NOT units arrayed elsewhere. How many books have been written about the German panzer units deployed well behind the beaches at Normandy on D-Day? A little focus here might prove helpful.

It has everything to do with: "The criminals had full control of their weapons at all times. They (criminals) had no problem with weapon retention." Hard to be in full control of your weapons when you are unconscious during most of the incident.

What happened to the bad guys as a result of the force of impact during the chase/impact or after they may have been hit by projectiles or fragments is pretty inconsequential. It is the weapon retention (or lack thereof) on the part of the FBI agents that is the focus of that discussion.

Why? Do you think it was an issue?

Then we are in agreement here. It was the lack of weapon retention on the part of the FBI officers that reduced their ability to fight.

Yep, and Florida is a pretty big place. In this particular place there were 14 agents covering a 60 block urban area.

Where they HAD to anticipate that they might encounter the suspects under less than ideal circumstances and might be forced to exchange fire with them. What you neglect to observe is that these few agents, conducting “surveillance or street duty” CHOSE to pursue and ram or attempt to corner ARMED and DANGEROUS suspects armed with no more than what you state were typical service weapons for their posture. It was a DUMB move and the results of the pressed encounter are evidenced fully.

Sigh. For about the umpteenth time, the agents didn't go out planning to engage the suspects, they were made by the suspects and that changed the dynamics significantly. The agents were out looking for potential hit sites and with the intentions of tailing the BGs back to their home. Actually encountering them was a bit of a surprise at that time, and one they were trying to work with. In fact, contrary to what some here have claimed, the agents on the scene were trying to get some help from marked units to conduct the takedown. The BGs pushed the situation too fast.You are certainly entitled to your opinion, no matter how much it seems to disagree with the facts.

“Trying to work with”? What? The element of surprise having been compromised and at a tactical disadvantage? The bad guys did not “push” the situation. The FBI agents did. They inadvertently detected the suspects and pushed for a “tail” and stop AFTER they knew they also had been detected. Had the agents backed off, there is little doubt the suspects would have fled. Gee, it’s just too bad that the suspects decided not to simply jump into the net, huh?

The “facts” are that the Miami Shootout went down in the annals as one of the worst law enforcement shootouts in history and was studied as such. It was recorded that way because of the mistakes made by law enforcement, NOT any other participants, tools or circumstances.

I'd agree. But as that scenartio has nothing in comon with what happened here, I fail to see its relevance.

That is PRECISELY what happened here. Perhaps you extracted some other conclusion, but the sequence of events and decisions on the part of the agents on scene disagrees with whatever that might be.

The BGs could have escaped, there could have been civilians injured, more agents could have been killed, etc.

Really? How could the bad guys eluding the officers (and as a result, having an unplanned shootout in a residential area where agents were killed) have been a worse outcome? The agents would have now known the suspects were still operating in the area and could have tightened the “60 block” net just a bit more in the hours following the escape, don’t you think? Etcetera this to death, but forcing a unplanned and unexpected confrontation with heavily armed and violent suspects in a residential area is NOT a prudent decision, given the option to back off and cordon off a much more restricted area, with the perpetrators having exposed themselves.

Your ability to 2nd guess after the fact and perform the Monday morning quarterback drill are duly noted.

Ad hominem? I’ve made my point. You failed to make anything of the sort. You are the one projecting the outcome had the agents used some common sense and backed off (The BGs could have escaped, there could have been civilians injured, more agents could have been killed, etc.) The fact remains – agents died and the incident has been recorded as a large blunder on the part of the bureau and an example of what NOT TO DO under such circumstances.

Again, could-would-should. The reality is that stuff didn't happen then and wouldn't happen now given the same situation.

We are not discussing what might happen today. We are discussing what happened THEN. The agents were perfectly capable of avoiding a firefight with heavily armed suspects in a residential area where they should have known their training, tools and deployment were lacking what might be required should things get ugly. Common sense was as available then as it is today. Someone just needed to ensure it made its way into policy or procedure. Absent that, a ‘gung-ho’ mentality prevailed and we see the net result.

Again, it might be nice if your accusations and claims had some relationship to reality. The agents were not lightly armed FOR THE TIME. The assault was not uncoordinated or impromptu, it was done in a coordinted manner at a time the agents thought was best in that situation.

They WERE lightly armed for the MISSION they chose to take on. Even you state that it was their mission to perform detection and surveillance until the prepared units could arrive. Are you claiming that they had no policy or procedure in place in the event the bad guys detected the surveillance and might attempt to flee? What the agents “thought best” was either procedure/policy, wasn’t procedure policy or was a blatant lack of common sense under either circumstance.

Let's see now...they got several hits on that man, some fairly early in the fight, which were fatal. They did this in an environment with lots of cover and concealement, obscured by a fair amount of smoke, lots of dust, and a huge difference in light levels. All while being shot at. And the area included much more than a 50 foot limit. Perhaps you could have done better. Maybe you will share with us your experience in similar situations?

This has nothing to do with my level of experience in similar situations. These were trained (supposedly) FBI agents that were assigned and tasked to detect, perform surveillance and apprehend specific suspects who were provided intelligence and a PLAN to do so. It’s pretty obvious that their training, tools and tactics were not up to the task. They CHOSE to pursue the suspects and attempt to detain and apprehend them where the suspects had ample warning that a confrontation was coming. The results of such poor planning and tactics speak for themselves.

Because the agents hadn't intended to pounce on the goons. The FBI wasn't ready for a shootout, and hadn't planned on a shootout. They were out doing surveillance, with the idea that they would follow the BGs home, then get a team in to take them down. That was fairly standard procedure. Just didn't work out this time.

It's not that it "didn't work out this time". It's because they made a conscious DECISION to deviate from the plan and they got their backsides handed to them on a platter. As a result, the Bureau, and LE in general, learned some valuable lessons.

[Th0r]

They were outgunned, and they probably shouldnt have been using handguns. I certainly think the handgun use and caliber should have been questioned. The FBI shootout sounds like a North Hollywood to me.
Ill thought out by the police/FBI.

[David Armstrong]

“Nonsense” would be the DECISION, active or passive, that led to FBI agents carrying inadequate firepower resulting in their getting themselves shot to pieces.

Do you really think the agents intentionally decided to carry around inadequate firepower? Probably not. I think we can take the agents at their word about what they were thinking and why they did things. The firepower was normal for the time and assignment, and considered perfectly adequate.

The FACT is that these agents were attempting to LOCATE and perform surveillance on two known heavily armed and dangerous suspects.

Right, LOCATE AND PERFORM SURVEILLANCE, not actively engage.

What happened to the bad guys as a result of the force of impact during the chase/impact or after they may have been hit by projectiles or fragments is pretty inconsequential.

True but that wasn't the issue. What was being discussed was the incorrect claim that "They (criminals) had no problem with weapon retention".

Then we are in agreement here. It was the lack of weapon retention on the part of the FBI officers that reduced their ability to fight.

No, we are not in agreement here. You might want to go back and read the backnotes here. My comment was in response to "Care to comment on the agents weapon retention after they were shot or disabled?" After they are already shot or disabled the retention issue is somewhat moot. Of course, IIRC only one agent had retention issues, so it is somewhat moot on that point also.

Where they HAD to anticipate that they might encounter the suspects under less than ideal circumstances and might be forced to exchange fire with them.

Again, all the available information indicates that is just not correct.

It was a DUMB move and the results of the pressed encounter are evidenced fully.

It was the result of a quck decision that lead to a once in a decade (or more) result. Not dumb, just the lesser of evils as they understood it at that time. It's nice to sit here years later and play Monday-morning quarterback after getting all sorts of info the guys on the scene having to make that quick decision did not have.

The bad guys did not “push” the situation. The FBI agents did.

Facts are troublesome things, but they should not be ignored. The BGs pushed the situation by grabbing weaponry and readying it. The FBI had to change things to respond to the changing threat.

Had the agents backed off, there is little doubt the suspects would have fled.

Yes, and the fear was that could lead to a far worse situation. Do you think the FBI should have just let the BGS go entirely? Or let the BGs get to someplace with better cover, or hostages, or more weapons?

The “facts” are that the Miami Shootout went down in the annals as one of the worst law enforcement shootouts in history and was studied as such.

If by "worst" you are meaning "incompetent" or something similar I must have missed that in all the research. But what do I know? I mean, I've just read the actual after-action reports, the officers statemetns, the forensic analysis, and stuff like that. I know in the popular press there have been some pretty wild claims, but in the professional LE field I don't remember seeing that.

That is PRECISELY what happened here.

No, it is not even particularly close.

Really? How could the bad guys eluding the officers (and as a result, having an unplanned shootout in a residential area where agents were killed) have been a worse outcome?

More agents killed, bystanders killed, hostages taken---lots of things could have happened.

Ad hominem? I’ve made my point.

Huh?? You are 2nd guessing the agents on the scene. It is what is commonly referred to Monday morning quarterbacking. Nothing ad hominem about that at all. As for your point, yes, you've aptly demonstrated how little you understand about LE in general and this incident in particular.

We are discussing what happened THEN.

Yes. And when discussing what happened then and why, it should be looked at in that context. What was the philosophy, the tactics, the accepted procedures, etc. at that time.

They WERE lightly armed for the MISSION they chose to take on.

No they weren't, and no matter how many times you say otherwise it doesn't change things a bit. Virtually any group of officers at that time, armed with shotguns and revolvers, would not be considered lightly armed.

This has nothing to do with my level of experience in similar situations.

Actually it does. You claim they did a lousy job AND you mis-state the facts. Some experience on your part might help you understand that they did a pretty good job given the circumstances.

It's not that it "didn't work out this time".

Yes, it is exactly that it didn't work out this time. The agents were doing something that had been done hundreds or thousands of times before, by hundreds of different officers, according to tactics, training, and procedures common at the time. It usually was (and still frequently is) the right thing to do. You are right in that we did learn some lessons, but to try to fault the agents because they hadn't learned those lessons yet is somewhat questionable, IMO.

[Perldog007]

Better caliber or better tactics?

YES!!!

That is what happened. Better calibers now out there. One of the survivors is/was an instructor out at Quantico to improve tactics.

[David Armstrong]

Better caliber or better tactics?
YES!!!
That is what happened. Better calibers now out there. One of the survivors is/was an instructor out at Quantico to improve tactics.

Exactly. The agents did what they had been trained to do with what they had been given. Thanks to them we learn and improve both the tools and tactics. Miami, North Hollywood, Norco, etc. all have their costs, but all make us better in the long run.

[Jager1]

David,


I'm not debating their armaments for their assigned mission. I am saying that, once they were detected by the suspects, they deviated from that mission and the results were less than ideal. I'm also not debating their training, skill levels, department weapon/ammunition choices...I am simply pointing out that under the circumstances, the choice to pursue, attempt to detain/arrest these subjects was obviously not the best one if it resulted in dead/wounded agents.

I do note that you are persistent in your claim that citizens could have been wounded, taken hostage or that things could have gotten worse had the agents not chosen to be confrontational with the subjects Platt and Mattix. Ironically, in recent threads here on the forum, where the topic revolves around BG's having a firearm and are menacing store clerks (or other citizens) you seem to propose a non-confrontational position by someone (an armed citizen) witnessing it. Have your thoughts changed since the Miami Shootout discussion? Just curious. Because I see a disparity of thought.

The agents firepower was inadequate to directly engage two armed subjects with the profile these two had been assigned. This was evidenced by the results.

Right, LOCATE AND PERFORM SURVEILLANCE, not actively engage.

And they violated this mission profile and the results were less than ideal.

Again, all the available information indicates that is just not correct.

You are an agent assigned to actively identify/locate known armed and violent subjects and never conjure the idea that you might stumble upon them and that the subjects might try to flee or actively resist? That somewhere in the briefing that this was not identified and a contingency plan made clear to the agents? I guess Murphy's Laws of Combat and a plan not surviving actual contact with the enemy hadn't been stumbled upon in 1986?

It was the result of a quck decision that lead to a once in a decade (or more) result. Not dumb, just the lesser of evils as they understood it at that time.

Semantics. The incident did NOT gain notoriety because agents chose the lesser of two evils "as they understood it at the time". It gained notoriety because of multiple factors, not just firearm selection and tactics. It was also studied because of some of the choices made by the agents on the whole and their individual choices. I think the agents did quite well considering the seemingly high level of luck the perpetrators enjoyed, all things considered. I'm not Monday-morning-quarterbacking anything outside of their choice to confront and engage two heavily armed and determined subjects where the agents themselves were lightly armed, were caught unprepared and off-balance, had lost the element of surprise, had been able to gather little intelligence regarding the subjects in the moments leading up to the choice to confront the subjects, were having communication and backup issues and seemed to have very little in the way of spare ammunition, just to name a few. Ignoring that these issues played a major role in the outcome of the engagement does not lead to the best discussion of the topic. The original question was whether it was handgun caliber or tactics. Although the actual answer is not that simple, given the two choices, it was certainly tactics that led to the outcome that was experienced.

And when discussing what happened then and why, it should be looked at in that context. What was the philosophy, the tactics, the accepted procedures, etc. at that time.

And either the agents adhered to them and were failed by them, or they did not and failed themselves. The research I have done leads me to believe it was a combination of both and not so black and white to the contrary, as you seem to prefer to have others believe.

Virtually any group of officers at that time, armed with shotguns and revolvers, would not be considered lightly armed.

When attempting to corner and confront suspects armed with semi-automatic long-arms, evidenced military training and an understood willingness to use both, the CHOICE to do so, when armed thusly, comes into question.

If by "worst" you are meaning "incompetent" or something similar I must have missed that in all the research.

What you missed is my exact point. The Miami shootout was/is one of the worst shootout incidents involving LE this country has witnessed. Are you claiming it wasn’t/isn’t?

Actually it does. You claim they did a lousy job AND you mis-state the facts. Some experience on your part might help you understand that they did a pretty good job given the circumstances.

I am saying nothing of the sort. I’m saying they could have made better decisions, even circa 1986. Making the decision to tackle these suspects while knowing their disposition and being armed as they were, the agents had to know the dangers. Mindset was a big factor in how this played out on BOTH sides. A determined foe, armed even in parity, can be a deadly adversary as these agents found out, let alone when equipped with superior weaponry and tactics. The agents actions were heroic, and quite amazing considering what they found themselves confronted with, albeit through their own choosing or direction.

Had one of the suspects not been incapacitated early on and had been equally armed with a semi-automatic rifle and determined – it stands to reason that the Miami Shootout might have been dubbed the Miami Massacre.

The mere fact that the incident had to be studied and so many changes required in equipment, tactics, communication and coordination with other agencies since is indicative that mistakes were made, at a minimum at the leadership and command structure levels. Further, the actions of the individual agents can also be criticized as even the literature available to the public indicates.

I am not condemning the officers for not adhering to policies/procedures/tactics or equipment load outs developed long since the actual event. In fact, I’m not condemning anybody. I am, however, critical of anyone, especially a member of LE that would make the decision to directly confront such subjects on a public street with no imminent threat to the public while not prepared or equipped to contain and subdue a situation that had all the propensity to get out of hand. Which it almost did and at the cost of life and limb.

I sense you are reading criticisms from me where there are none.

I can see that you have your opinion and I have mine and that neither of us is likely to sway the other. That's fine. I can't help but notice that you duck the point that the agents, with a tasking to investigate, possibly locate and perform surveillance, once detected, chose to pursue and detain/arrest suspects that were known to be violent, trained and heavily armed - and they did so in a residential area. That these were FBI agents, not some Podunk PD first year detectives investigating a local bicycle theft ring – and they had to anticipate the level of experience and determination of individuals who had robbed banks, armored cars and had the brazen audacity to rob armed people of their firearms. And they opted to do this with revolvers with .38 Special +P loads, 9mm’s and one pump shotgun, none of which had numerous reloads. THAT had to be a salient point even the most inexperienced evaluator would take notice of in the preliminary stages of any investigation into the altercation.

To imply or state that these points did not surface in the after-action investigation and discussions since is questionable at best and a disservice to the officer’s contributions at worst. I admire these agents for their determination and sacrifice. They are true heroes in my opinion. But cloaking them in the impenetrable veil of “They were protecting the public and were solely victims of the times” is not going to fly with me. Common sense existed in 1986. As did individual thought. Likewise mindset. These most certainly played a significant factor in the events that transpired when these two entities collided.

[Rifleman 173]

One other thing... The FBI is notorious among local cops for being too secretive. They are more than happy to take any information that the locals have BUT they're never going to pass information back down. The FBI kept secret a whole bunch of information to themselves about Matix and Platt until the shootout was pretty much over. By then their secret-keeping attitude almost got more agents shot and killed because the local Miami P.D. had no idea what was going on until civilians called in to report that there were a bunch of men, armed with guns shooting each other up in a residential area. When the uniformed Miami officers got to the shootout, they had FBI agents walking around in civilian clothes with weapons out and no identification showing which meant that the uniforms drew down on the FBI guys until things got straightened out. The whole Miami shootout was one bad tactic after another bad tactic. It is sad to say that the FBI lost agents that day to bad tactics but it happened. I bet that J. Edgar Hoover was spinning like a whirling dervish in his grave that day. Stuff like that would NEVER of happened if Hoover had been in charge of the FBI at that time period.

[IdahoG36]

FBI Miami shootout: Better Handgun Caliber or better Tactics

I think that if the agents were equipped with our modern hollow point loads, their 9mms would have been more effective at quick incapacitation. Defensive handgun loads and bullet designs have improved greatly over the last 20 years. If you look at the ballistic data for Winchester's 127 gr +p+ Ranger, it is quite impressive, in both penetration depth and expansion. Federal's 115 gr +p+ is another impressive load. These rounds have made the 9mm a much more effective fighting caliber.

I don't neccesarily think that a caliber change would make things much different now, but 20 years ago, I would say it would have. Older 9mm loads weren't the greatest fight stoppers, you just had more round capacity then any other chambering of the time. If they were equipped with 230gr ball .45 acp instead of 9mm, or 125gr jhp .357 magnum over the .38 special, things could have possibly turned out differently.

[Hook686]

yes.

[Tamara]

Let's bear in mind that it's only in retrospect that we know that Platt and Matix were insane ninja death zombies. Up to that point, all the FBI agents knew is that they'd back-shot a rent-a-cop and bushwhacked some guy plinking in the swamp. That's hardly "Killer Kommando" stuff. The agents knew that there were eight of them with more on the way, and only two bad guys who might twig to the surveillance and do something unpredictable. In retrospect, I'd have probably made the same call they did.

What they needed wasn't better guns or bullets or tactics or the 82nd Airborne (although all that stuff would have been nice); what they needed was better luck, and that's hard to get made-to-order.

[Art Eatman]

While I agree with the fundamentals of Tamara's comment, lemme add some 20/20 hindsight perspective:

There seems to have been a certain amount of "attitude" of "Me FBI; you, punk." This is just based on reading of the overall behavior of the various agents who were involved. My opinion on this is obviously open to error. Anyway, this could have led to a certain lack of thinking ahead, a lack of appropriate wariness.

I've worn glasses for decades. I deliberately chose the aviator style frames where the earpiece wraps around my ear for better security. When I canoe on a river, I add the little security-gizmo strap. Note that one agent's glasses were reported to have been jarred loose and he couldn't find them.

I've done a bunch of car racing, with a couple of hard impacts. Stuff flies around at impact, seat belts or no. It was reported that one agent had put his firearm on the seat and then had an impact. Hey, even just a rough jeep trail can sometimes have a nine-pound rifle bounce off the ceiling of my pickup's cab.

This is not to talk about fault so much as to point out those little things that can screw up your world.

To me, certain sorts of care and precautions are warranted as built-in reflexes from having given thought to "What if...?"

[JollyRoger]

Just to toss in my $.02:

The FBI is getting bashed on a few points here that might be unjustified. Remember that the agents here were spread out over several miles, trying to spot a vehicle that MIGHT be showing up. Lots of banks on the highway they were cruising. There was only a very small chance they were going to come across these guys: a higher probability might have justified SWAT participation rather than just the bank robbery squad, but as a practical matter they might have been doing this type of surveillance for a number of days and as FBI SWAT are part-timers (they work cases), they couldn't tie them up like that. As posted above, the objective was to surveill the bad guys until they set down and an arrest could be planned. When conducting a rolling surveillance, especially in a place like Miami where the weather does not allow big coats, you have to be dressed in a manner which will allow you to go from vehicle to foot surveillance in a matter of seconds in case the bad guys are using a switch vehicle and walk through a shopping mall to a separate parking lot and vehicle, or in case they split up with one on foot and another using the car. This pretty much rules out vests, raid jackets, and quickly accessible long weapons (since they would have to be left unsecured in the car if an agent went on foot - a big Bureau no-no.)

Speaking from experience, if you are trying to surveill a surveillance conscious subject even with multiple vehicles, you are pretty much going to run into a situation where you have a choice between dropping off or getting made. This situation was tougher because the vehicles were strung out over a large area, and because public safety dictated the agents following the bad guys (Grogan and Dove) could not drop off, as the bad guys were not just drug dealers or petty criminals, they were killing people. Since Grogan and Dove had no close vehicle to switch off with, and Platt and Mattox were surveillance conscious (driving extremely slow to spot a tail), Grogan and Dove were spotted, and Platt and Mattox overtly loaded weapons and started pointing them at the agents. Could they have dropped off and taken the chance of relocating the bad guys in the area once backup made it there? Sure. Their dedication got them killed because they knew how bad these guys were and could not afford to leave them on the loose, a decision made in a split second. I hardly think it justified to characterize this as a case of arrogant agents thinking "me, FBI. you, punk."

Regarding weapons, the agents with the 9mm's were some of those SWAT agents who work cases. The rank and file were not permitted autos, and in 85, the majority were still issued Model 10's in .38SPL, although some Model 13's in .357 may have been out by then, and personal weapons in .357 were permitted such as McNeil's model 19 and Mirele's L-frame. .357 rounds were not routinely issued, however, .38 +p were, and the FBI doesn't allow personal ammo either. Shotguns were issued on request and availability, but not rifles. SWAT could use rifles, but at that time the M16's used were not widely available even to SWAT, and since they could go full auto, they were not routinely maintained in vehicles. Platt on the other hand had a mini-14 and was nuts about it. Subsequent investigation showed he fired something like a thousand rounds a week in the Everglades playing with it. Unfortunately, he was real good with it, and was motivated, judging by his continued action with a fatal wound.

Some errors were obviously made by individual agents, but in law enforcement "the plan" routinely goes to sh** within about ten seconds of the call to execute. A committed, skilled bad guy can do a lot of damage because he doesn't have to play by the same rules as the good guys, he gets to pick many of the circumstances of the fight, and he has the option to quit at any time.

[Erik]

"FBI Miami shootout: Better Handgun Caliber or better Tactics?"

Better tactics, and that is how the lesson plan on this particular incident is largely taught. The plan, as already noted, is largely the work of the survivors and a failry competent peer review process.

[kgpcr]

Better round. I dont like 9mm for any combat shooting. Give me a .40 or a .45 any day. Just my .02

[Th0r]

Heres a thought, maybe the agents were dedicated enough to put their assses on the line so these two vermin would not kill any civillians

Couldnt have put it better.

The FBI agents were just in the wrong situation at the wrong time. But we should be thankful they are people who would put their lives on the line for others.

[Group9]

People keep glossing over that this happened over 20 years ago. I keep expecting someone to wonder why they didn't just whip out their cell phones and call the local PD while they were rolling along.

To the people here who are under forty years old, believe it or not, it was still not that common to wear ballistic vests, even for patrol officers in 1986. Almost all LEO's were still armed with revolvers back then. Cell phones were the size of toolboxes and cost about a $1 a minute to talk on. There were no de-confliction systems like NINJA, Safety-Net, etc. to let agenices with concurrent jurisdicdtions know what each other was up to.

And, most importantly, it was still relatively uncommon for heavily armed criminals to take on the police rather than giving up or running for it.

People say these agents were untrained without being old enough to know that this event was one of the things that caused police training to get a lot more effective and realistic.

Arguing whether better tactics or better weapons would have made this incident come out better glosses over the fact that this incident is the primary reason that officers have better tactics and better weapons today than they did 20 years ago. Like the Hollywood shootout, this was one of those defining incidents that made law enforcement wake up to some changes that needed to be made.

Anyone reading this should just be hoping that they would have done as well as these agents did with the training and equipment that were common at the time, if they had been there.

[Tamara]

Like I've said before, the biggest lesson to draw from Miami is that "some days you get the bear, and some days the bear gets you."

[Perldog007]

Like I've said before, the biggest lesson to draw from Miami is that "some days you get the bear, and some days the bear gets you."

Precisely why I like working in a warehouse and letting others chase bears.

Think it is interesting to examine those kinds of events and sometimes practical to know what happens in those situations we hope we never face.

Still think the answer is yes, better tactics and better weapons are two things that have been implemented by the folks involved.

[David Armstrong]

I am simply pointing out that under the circumstances, the choice to pursue, attempt to detain/arrest these subjects was obviously not the best one if it resulted in dead/wounded agents.

And I am pointing out that they had to make that decision quickly, based on the info they had, and that all this second-guesing is just that, second-guessing. The agents felt that letting the BGs get away or get to a position of their choice would have been a worse option.

I do note that you are persistent in your claim that citizens could have been wounded, taken hostage or that things could have gotten worse had the agents not chosen to be confrontational with the subjects Platt and Mattix. Ironically, in recent threads here on the forum, where the topic revolves around BG's having a firearm and are menacing store clerks (or other citizens) you seem to propose a non-confrontational position by someone (an armed citizen) witnessing it. Have your thoughts changed since the Miami Shootout discussion? Just curious. Because I see a disparity of thought.

No disparity. There is a world of difference between engaging an armed robber who has not killed anyone or threatened you and engaging a team of robbers who have already indicated they are willing to kill and have killed on at least one previous occassion.

The agents firepower was inadequate to directly engage two armed subjects with the profile these two had been assigned. This was evidenced by the results.

HUH?? Given that same firepower virtually any cop in the country at that time would have felt more than adequate.

And they violated this mission profile and the results were less than ideal.

So? Again, hindsight is nice, but mission profiles do change, and change rapidly.

Semantics.

Nope, not semantics. Good reasoning based on facts.

I'm not Monday-morning-quarterbacking anything outside of their choice to confront and engage two heavily armed and determined subjects where the agents themselves were lightly armed, were caught unprepared and off-balance, had lost the element of surprise, had been able to gather little intelligence regarding the subjects in the moments leading up to the choice to confront the subjects, were having communication and backup issues and seemed to have very little in the way of spare ammunition, just to name a few.

OK, then you are Monday-morning quarterbacking, and your opinion of what happened and why does not agree with the facts as stated by the agents involved and the evidence of the scene.

The research I have done leads me to believe it was a combination of both and not so black and white to the contrary, as you seem to prefer to have others believe.

And what research have you done? There is a lot of stuff out there, but not a lot of real info in the public domain outside of Anderson's.

What you missed is my exact point. The Miami shootout was/is one of the worst shootout incidents involving LE this country has witnessed. Are you claiming it wasn’t/isn’t?

Again, how are you defining "worst", as it is not clear to me.

I am saying nothing of the sort. I’m saying they could have made better decisions, even circa 1986.

Could, would, should. I'm saying the agents made an appropriate decision based on the information available to them at the time. Anything beyond that is pure speculation, and somewhat disengenous, IMO.

The mere fact that the incident had to be studied and so many changes required in equipment, tactics, communication and coordination with other agencies since....

This is just another example of that mis-statement of facts i mentioned. Yes, changes have been made in equipment and so on. But to attribute that to this event is just not accurate. Most changes in equipment have come about because the equipment available has changed. Communication abilities have improved. Inter-agency coordination has been enhanced. New tactics are emphasized. But most of that would have come about without the incident in Miami.

I am, however, critical of anyone, especially a member of LE that would make the decision to directly confront such subjects on a public street with no imminent threat to the public while not prepared or equipped to contain and subdue a situation that had all the propensity to get out of hand.

And given the facts of the case your criticism is unwarranted and amounts to Monday-morning quarterbacking. The agents made the stop where they did because they felt it was the best they were going to get, trying to minimize the threat to the public. As for preparation, again yo seem to keep ignoring the fact that they were as prepared and equiped as virtually any other LE group would have been at that time and given that assignment.

I can't help but notice that you duck the point that the agents, with a tasking to investigate, possibly locate and perform surveillance, once detected, chose to pursue and detain/arrest suspects that were known to be violent, trained and heavily armed - and they did so in a residential area.

I haven't ducked it at all. As I've pointed out the agents were made by the BGs and then had to adjust and change their goals on the fly. "No plan survives contact with the enemy" is quite appropriate here.

[Jager1]

As I've pointed out the agents were made by the BGs and then had to adjust and change their goals on the fly. "No plan survives contact with the enemy" is quite appropriate here.

And as a result, the agents got their backsides handed to them on a platter where a bit of common sense and humility (by not pursuing and attempting an immediate stop) might have offered more favorable odds.

Mindset certainly played a part in the choice to engage the suspects in the manner the agents did. The suspects simply didn't "roll over" and play dead (well, at least one of them didn't). They "changed their goals"? Is that criminal justice degree lingo for "They overreached and got the stuffing knocked out of them?"

The entire incident CAN certainly be analyzed and criticized based upon the bureaus choices, leaderships decisions and those made by the individual agents at the time. And it was on many levels at the time and still gets discussed even decades later, as we can see.

...were caught unprepared and off-balance, had lost the element of surprise, had been able to gather little intelligence regarding the subjects in the moments leading up to the choice to confront the subjects, were having communication and backup issues and seemed to have very little in the way of spare ammunition, just to name a few. Ignoring that these issues played a major role in the outcome of the engagement does not lead to the best discussion of the topic.

Sounds to me like they had no contingency plan whatsoever and that "changing goals" without proper prior planning had them suffering some drawbacks, to say the least.

Enough evidence is out there in the public domain to surface the questions, observations and criticisms that can be witnessed by attendees on many firearm and law enforcement discussion forums. To claim some clandestine knowledge and offering "trust me, I've seen the reports" as some type of moral authority as to which questions have been sufficiently answered and criticisms addressed is condescending and disingenuous at best. THAT rings of Monday morning quarterbacking at its finest.

"Sit down, shut up and listen, citizen".

Thank you John Madden.