[4V50 Gary]

Tactical skirmishing became universal during the Napoleonic Wars and the effectiveness of the French Voltigeurs and Tirailleurs convinced the British Army to raise its own light infantry and riflemen. The Austro-Hungarians, Russians and various German states already had jägers who served as skirmishers. By the time of the American Civil War virtually all infantry were trained in skirmishing. Additionally, both sides raised sharpshooter units that specialized as light infantry. Considered elite troops, sharpshooters often had the most dangerous assignments - in the skirmish line if not ahead of it. To a certain extent, this was offset by superior firearms and training.
Skirmishing itself had not changed much since Napoleon. One soldier describes skirmishing: “When once we were deployed, every man chose his own manner of fighting, sheltering himself behind a tree, stump, log, or any thing else that kept him partially out of sight. He gets shot at every time he moves or shows himself in the least, and also shoots at every enemy that he gets a fair glimpse of. Good marksmanship will do fearful execution when skirmishing, often more than the firing of a whole battalion when firing in the line of battle. The skirmisher, if he is good, has a good gun, and is cool and steady handed, will make sure of his mark almost every time...”
In the forty-six years between the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War, technological advances in firearms development increased the lethality of small arms. Some will be discussed here.

I. Percussion Ignition

Foremost change came with Rev. A. Forsyth’s discovery of the explosive property of fulminate of mercury, which he patented on April 11, 1807. When not at the pulpit, Rev. Forsyth was an avid wildfowler who was frustrated whenever birds reacted to his flintlock’s “flash” by flushing. He sought a less discernable combustion and found that fulminate of mercury when mixed with chlorate of potash produced the desired results. Several clumsy attempts were made to adapt Forsyth’s work to firearms and it was only after Joshua Shaw placed Forsyth’s compound into a copper cap or more properly, a percussion cap, that it was successfully adapted to firearms. Since the percussion cap was more rainproof and less prone to failure than the flintlock and faster to use, virtually all armies were re-equipping their troops with them in the 1830's.

Taking advantage of Reverend Forsyth’s discovery was a dentist named Maynard. The fulminate of mercury was applied in small, measured distance dabs on a strip of copper. This was rolled up like a child’s paper cap and stored within a special cavity in the gun lock. Cocking the hammer caused the roll to be advanced such that the hammer would fall upon a ready priming charge. While the Myanard Tape Primer speeded up the rate of fire, especially in cold weather when fingers were numb, it was susceptible to moisture. To offset this, the standard musket cap could always be resorted to as a back-up system. While it was adopted for the pre-war Model 1855 Springfield musket, the later Model 1861 and Model 1863 discarded it to simplify production.

The Model 1859 Sharps breechloading rifle also featured the Lawrence 50 pellet priming system. In lieu of a paper roll, the explosive compound was placed into tiny copper pellets that would “jump” from its magazine and be caught by the hammer as it fell. While the Lawrence priming system did have this advantage, most men preferred using caps unless there was either a dramatic need for increased rate of fire or when the fingers became numb with cold. On order of Ordnance Chief Ripley (probably to reduce cost and to increase production), the Lawrence automatic pellet priming system was discarded on the later Model 1863 Sharps.

II. The round ball’s eclipse

Nor was bullet design neglected and after centuries of the round ball’s predominance as the primary small arm missile, it was superceded. The minié ball, which was mentioned in the previous chapter, had a flaw. Loss of the plug would cause the skirt not to expand and the ball would tumble inaccurately from the muzzle. In 1854, Harper Ferry Armorer James H. Burton’s refined the minié by redesigning the skirt such that the bullet would expand without the aid of the plug. As the plug was no longer needed, the fear of losing the plug while loading became moot and the minié ball, more properly the Burton Ball, had come of age. For the first time regular line infantry could be armed with a weapon, the rifle musket, which loaded as fast as a musket yet enjoyed the rifle’s accuracy.

Furthermore, the minié ball was much more deadly than the round ball as one Confederate armed with a Mississippi learned. After his first engagement against the Union troops he wrote: “The regiment halted just behind the crest of the hill. The skirmishers advanced to the edge of the ravine under fire. We were ordered to lie down and open fire on the enemy. How far off were they? That was determined by three shots. One overshot, which was to go beyond, one undershot to fall short so you could easily calculate the range and the third shot meant business. I shot. Then I asked Johnnie to let me know where my ball hit. I raised the sight to five hundred yards and shot at the skirmishers opposite me. He did not take notice but deliberately continued loading and shooting. Many of our boys were firing by that time, but the Yanks were doing good work, for they killed several of our skirmishers. We then found that our Mississippi rifle would not carry as far as the Yankees’ Enfield rifle did, so orders were given to cease firing and fall back. We raced back and the only reason we ran was because we could not fly...”

The minié was deadly even at half a mile’s distance as one surgeon learned: “I was loading my ambulance one day at Cold Harbor with wounded men to send to the Corps Hospital, when a bullet struck the near horse just back of the shoulder, and passed through the horse, which instantly fell dead, then entered the off horse in a like manner and lodged under the skin of the off side; this off horse stood a moment, then fell dead on the near horse.” While it is unlikely that the horses were the intended target but instead that the bullet was either a stray or drifted from its aimed course, its ability to kill two horses at a half mile is remarkable.

Writing before the war, Lt. C. Wilcox warned: “Formerly artillery began battles; it could take its position at pleasure in front of infantry and deliver its fire without incurring danger or loss from the fire in return of the infantry. Now that the range of the rifle is equal, if not superior, to that of field-pieces, the influence of light artillery in battles will be lessened.
In the experiment at Hythe, in 1856, the effect of the fire of the Enfield rifle upon a piece of artillery with its men and horses was shown to be such, that it would be impossible for a field-battery to remain in front of infantry at a distance of 810 yards for ten minutes; three minutes alone sufficed at that distance for 30 files to wound the men and horses to such an extent as to disable the piece.”

Confirming Wilcox’s claim is John Gibbon who wrote, “The fire of the ordinary musket is uncertain beyond 200 yards, the variations in height, from one shot to another, at that distance, often exceed one or one and a half yards. But when troops are in compact masses, the fire is still very effective beyond that distance. At 650 yards the musket-bullet is still very deadly, and instances have been known where men have been killed or wounded at greater distances. In general, the infantry soldier in the excitement of battle, does not make full use of the accuracy of fire of his arm, which has led some to think there is no great advantage in perfecting the accuracy of fire of arms intended for the use of the mass of troops. But this is evidently a mistake, since out of a number of shots fired from any two pieces, that one which is the most accurate, will have the greatest number effective... The effective range of the rifle spherical bullet, is over 400 yards. The oblong rifle-bullet is effective at 1,000 yards; but these arms exhibit their marked superiority when used by isolated marksmen.” John Gibbon adds: “[t]he best position for such an arm is in the hands of superior marksman, detached as light infantry, or in deliberate firing from behind obstacles of some kind.” Another officer summed up the advantage of the long range minié rifle: “Will you dispatch General Cox that our long-range muskets are much needed in the present service. Our experience the last few days satisfies every one that a man who can kill at 400 yards is worth three or four men with common muskets.”

Another advantage of the minié gun (guns firing the minie ball were sometimes called minie guns by the soldiers) is that virtually every infantryman thus armed was a potential sharpshooter. Prior to this, shooting beyond 300 yards could only have been performed by the best riflemen. Not only were the guns longer range, but also had better penetration than the round ball musket or rifle.