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shaggy · January 13, 2005, 04:50 PM

You're catching on quick Grasshopper.

There's a few basic cases interpreting the Commerce Clause though - and once I explain the first, I'm sure you'll see the problem.

The first major case in Commerce Clause jurisprudence is Wickard v. Filburn. Basically, the Congress passed a law regulating wheat production based on the Commerce Clause. A farmer grew more wheat than allowed under the law. When the case went to court his argument was that the excess was that it was his own wheat, grown on his farm, for his own personal consumption. In essence, the wheat he produced never travelled in interstate commerce and couldn't be regulated under the law based on the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, his wholly INTRAstate production of wheat was still subject to the law because if many people did the same thing, it would negatively affect interstate commerce. IOW, by producing wheat on his own farm, for his own use, and never crossing a state line he STILL had an effect on interstate commerce because such home use would be that much less wheat in demand on the interstate market.

(Do you see where this is going?)

If you look at the '34 NFA and the '86 GOPA as an attempt to limit and regulate interstate commerce in machineguns on the civilian market, it should become clearer. The artificially inflated prices for full autos are an effect of the Congressional attempt to limit and regulate interstate commerce in machineguns. By throwing open the doors to make new machineguns, even for home use (never to transfer or cross state lines) it would have the same effect on the interstate market for machineguns as the farmer's home grown wheat in Wickard. It would cause the prices of transferable machineguns to drop as people wouldn't pay those enormous sums for registered sears - they'd just make one at home. And by doing so, they would nonetheless depress the interstate market and affect interstate commerce.

January 13, 2005, 04:50 PM	#6
shaggy Senior Member Join Date: October 9, 2004 Posts: 1,519	You're catching on quick Grasshopper. There's a few basic cases interpreting the Commerce Clause though - and once I explain the first, I'm sure you'll see the problem. The first major case in Commerce Clause jurisprudence is Wickard v. Filburn. Basically, the Congress passed a law regulating wheat production based on the Commerce Clause. A farmer grew more wheat than allowed under the law. When the case went to court his argument was that the excess was that it was his own wheat, grown on his farm, for his own personal consumption. In essence, the wheat he produced never travelled in interstate commerce and couldn't be regulated under the law based on the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, his wholly INTRAstate production of wheat was still subject to the law because if many people did the same thing, it would negatively affect interstate commerce. IOW, by producing wheat on his own farm, for his own use, and never crossing a state line he STILL had an effect on interstate commerce because such home use would be that much less wheat in demand on the interstate market. (Do you see where this is going?) If you look at the '34 NFA and the '86 GOPA as an attempt to limit and regulate interstate commerce in machineguns on the civilian market, it should become clearer. The artificially inflated prices for full autos are an effect of the Congressional attempt to limit and regulate interstate commerce in machineguns. By throwing open the doors to make new machineguns, even for home use (never to transfer or cross state lines) it would have the same effect on the interstate market for machineguns as the farmer's home grown wheat in Wickard. It would cause the prices of transferable machineguns to drop as people wouldn't pay those enormous sums for registered sears - they'd just make one at home. And by doing so, they would nonetheless depress the interstate market and affect interstate commerce.