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Originally Posted by Metal god
...Did the court leave an out for DV convictions that are not Physical or even unintentionally physical . Like slamming the door and something falls over and bangs there foot ? I'm trying to find out is this a blanket/black and white issue....
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Castleman does not answer that question because that was not within the scope of the question before the Court.
Castleman claimed that his conviction by a Tennessee court for battery was not a "conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" for the purposes of 18 USC 922(g)(9) which would prohibit him from possessing a gun or ammunition. Castleman's argument was basically that he didn't commit a violent act on his victim, the mother of his child. The thing is that we don't know exactly how Castleman intentionally caused harm to the mother of his child.
The Supreme Court concluded, essentially, that under well established legal principles indirectly intentionally injuring someone would constitute an act of violence for the purposes of 18 USC 922(g)(9). Poisoning someone was used as an example by the Court:
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...The "use of force" in Castleman's example is not the act of "sprinkl[ing]" the poison; it is the [*8] act of employing poison knowingly as a device to cause physical harm. That the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick or punch), does not matter. Under Castleman's logic, after all, one could say that pulling the trigger on a gun is not a "use of force" because it is the bullet, not the trigger, that actually strikes the victim. Leocal held that the "use" of force must entail "a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct," 543 U. S., at 9; it did not hold that the word "use" somehow alters the meaning of "force." ...
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